Interview with Enrico Morando: "If Europe doesn't change and react, it's destined to disappear."

Enrico Morando, leader of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party and president of the LibertàEguale Association, former Deputy Minister of Economy and Finance in the Renzi and Gentiloni governments.

As a convinced European, what reflections does a Europe at Trump's mercy, subservient on tariffs, inert on Gaza, marginal on Ukraine, provoke in you? The European Union is caught in a vise that threatens its very existence: on the one hand, the Trump administration's decision to end the long period of " benevolent hegemony " exercised by the United States, replacing it with "America first," a set of actions, attitudes, and ideas that transform the United States into an "extractive" power, whose decisions are guided solely by the goal of extracting the benefits it deems necessary from the rest of the world, and in particular from former allies. On the other, Putin's Russia, which has declared war on the European Union—starting with the attack on Ukraine—because it considers the contagion that the system of values ​​and principles embodied by the "European model" could have on the body and historical function of "great mother Russia" to be disastrous. Putin doesn't (much) want a piece of Donbass. He wants to uproot the democratic and liberal plant that began to grow in Maidan Square. It's a change of context so radical and sudden it's breathtaking. The two jaws of the pincer gripping us are different, but they have more than one thing in common: they act simultaneously and are driven by a principle that prevails over all others: only political-military power relations matter. In this context, the tactic of addressing threats one by one, as they take shape and create emergencies, is by definition doomed to failure: in the new world emerging before our eyes, while we lingered over the weakness of politics in the face of the immeasurable power of large multinationals, Europe can remain free and autonomous, capable of contributing to a new order of peace, freedom, and well-being, only if it quickly fills the deficit it has accumulated on two crucial fronts: deterrence capacity and presence at the forefront of technological innovation. And this deficit is what explains why—on all the fronts addressed in your question—Europe's voice is so feeble. Of course, it was a mistake to begin the negotiations on tariffs by admitting a trade imbalance that doesn't exist ... but even if von der Leyen hadn't committed this mistake, the discussions would never have become a real negotiation, capable of generating mutual benefits. Although the European Union's economy—in terms of GDP and the size of its respective markets—is comparable to that of the United States, the Union's dependence on the United States' deterrent capacity to guarantee its security makes it practically impossible for Europeans to assert their rights, even when they have plenty of them. Especially when faced with a long-term threat (as defined by the latest NATO summit) like Putin's Russia at the Union's borders. This is the great return of "Politics." The fact that this return takes forms we don't like doesn't exempt us from considering it a reality. Therefore, one of two things: either we attack the structural causes of Europe's weakness, or we prepare ourselves for a fate of subordination to those Giuliano da Empoli calls " the predators ."

Speaking of von der Leyen's mistakes: if she had been a member of the European Parliament, would she have voted for the Commission she presides over? If I were an MEP, I would obviously be a member of the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) Group, which decided to support von der Leyen. So, yes, I would have voted in favor. Speaking of group discipline, can I digress a little?

Please… I see something curious happening with some frequency and on relevant issues among the European Parliament members of my party, the Democratic Party: the S&D group, which includes the Italian Democratic Party members, meets and formulates a voting decision (on the last occasion I remember, voting in favor of the Ukrainian army's use of Taurus missiles on targets in Russian territory, from which attacks on Ukrainian cities are launched). A few articles in the Italian press follow: Secretary Schlein reportedly disagrees with the S&D Group's decision... Finally, the Democratic Party members are divided in their vote: some, the reformists, vote in accordance with the S&D Group's decision. Others, vote differently...

Excuse me, but what's so curious about this so far? Well, the curious fact is that both in internal party discussions (when and if they occur) and in statements to the media (these always occur), those suspected of violating internal discipline are the former (i.e., those who respected their parliamentary group's voting instructions), and not the latter (those who contradicted it). It wouldn't be worth pointing out this fact if it didn't reveal a rather serious political problem: the Democratic Party, even under Schlein's leadership, loudly confirms—even, as happened in the Italian Parliament, to the point of tears—its federalist stance. Not only as a strategic perspective, but here and now: no to the rearmament plan , too "national." A European army immediately. However, a contradiction emerges as enormous: if you want (even "immediately ") a United States of Europe, you must want, even before immediately, European parties. By joining the PSE (Secretary Renzi), the Democratic Party has made a clear choice. It would be wise not to deny it. Especially because, if there is a chance of a positive exit from the impasse we Europeans find ourselves in, this possibility is closely tied to the European center-left's capacity for initiative.

Good. He would have voted for von der Leyen. But today, after what's happening? I've already mentioned the Union's structural weaknesses: its accumulated delay in deterrence and its presence (or absence) at the innovation frontier. It's absurd to blame von der Leyen for this delay. Reading her article in Il Sole 24 Ore last Sunday, I find something unacceptable: if things are as I've attempted to argue, the Union's integration and innovation efforts needed to rapidly overcome these two weaknesses are literally gigantic. But how can we expect to convince European citizens to do so if we treat them like unwitting children, describing the agreement we've had to endure as " strong, albeit imperfect" ? An agreement in which the only advantage for Europeans is that we avoided— with the 15% agreement —30% tariffs on our exports to the United States? Is it any wonder that European citizens interpret this rhetoric as the best proof that, ultimately, there's no reason to go to great lengths to change almost everything about the current Union? The first condition for success is speaking the truth. Von der Leyen fails to do so, and she's making a grave political mistake.

In Europe, on the major issues of peace, employment, shared taxation, and ecological transition, is there a progressive front? Of course it exists. It is centered on the social democratic, labor, and democratic parties, but it goes beyond these fundamental forces and embraces other pro-European reformist formations. The question is not whether it exists, but whether it has the political culture, popular roots, imagination, and leadership necessary to fulfill its function in such a radically changed context. If the prevailing idea were to be that the governing center-left could fulfill its role as a force inspired by the values ​​of peace, justice, freedom, and solidarity, and by the interests of those who live off their labor, doing more or less " what it has always done," this group of political forces would become one of the factors of decline, not one of the protagonists of redemption. Goals such as Europe's autonomous deterrent capacity—as a pillar of NATO, if the US halts its drift away, or without the US—or a consolidated presence of European champions on the technological frontier, cannot be achieved without a sharp leap in integration in foreign and defense policy, in common debt—which attracts significant private capital to finance ambitious industrial policy projects—and in overcoming internal barriers to our single market that depress growth potential far more than Trump's tariffs will. The parties that comprise the pro-European majority—the People's Party and the Socialist Party—have a fundamental role to play in guiding this process. This begins with their staunch support for the effort known as the "coalition of the willing." After the tragedy of the red carpet and the kneeling American soldiers unrolling it before Putin, the initiative taken months ago by Macron, Starmer, and Merz, along with their active presence at the Trump-Zelensky negotiating table, has been a lifeline of sorts. This approach must also apply to other issues on the European agenda.

Coming to internal affairs. With autumn comes the election season. Rather than content, the center-left is discussing and arguing over candidates . Are we at the political souk? In general, as a staunch autonomist, I find there's excessive "central" intervention in local decisions, both regarding candidacies and political programs. If the Democratic Party hadn't sacrificed "its" primaries for the selection of local candidates on the altar of national political alliances, perhaps we would have witnessed a different story. It's a shame, because this obscures the obvious superiority of our local government personnel.

Speaking of alliances, some are crying foul about the "grillification" of Elly Schlein's Democratic Party. Not even the local and national leaders of the Five Star Movement (M5S) are promoting "grillization" for themselves. The problem is rather a suffocating privilege for political alliances: the only thing that matters is who I side with, not where I want to go. Yet, experience should suggest adopting a different approach: if you are the largest party in the potential coalition—and the Democratic Party has been for some time now—point out a path and promote clear objectives, with broad popular impact and relevant to the problems of the moment. For leadership, propose coalition primaries. Mediation with potential allies happens later.

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Umberto De Giovannangeli